Deletion certificates
DELETE /v1/packets/{id} (and the retention and ZDR sweeps) destroy a packet's data and issue a
signed deletion certificate: 202 with a dcert_id, GET /v1/deletion-certificates/{id}.
What a certificate is
A file {"certificate": {...}, "signature": "<header>..<signature>"}:
- the
certificateobject is serialized with the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (RFC 8785); - the signature is a detached JWS (RFC 7515 Appendix F): the payload is not repeated, the verifier rebuilds it from the canonical JSON;
- algorithms: EdDSA (Ed25519: local key or OpenBao Transit) or ES256 (AWS KMS), taken from the key, never from the header;
- the public keys, including every historical
kid, are published at/.well-known/dx-deletion-jwks.json(public keys only).
Fields (schemas/governance/deletion-certificate-1.0.json): id, version, issued_at,
subject (packet, tenant, project), method (crypto_shred), scope, legal_basis
(manual, retention_policy, zdr), legal_hold_check, destroyed[] (every blob with its
dek_id, every row table with its count, every extraction), retained[] (blobs another packet
still references), steps[] (one per store with the verification query and its result),
backup_status (crypto_shredded; ciphertext remains in backups until <date>),
provider_retention, exclusions, workflow_version and manifest_hash (SHA-256 of the
canonical destroyed, retained and steps).
Verify it offline
$ extractit cert verify dcert_01….json --jwks dx-deletion-jwks.json
{"id": "dcert_01…", "ok": true, "reason": null} # exit 0
No database and no network are needed (an http(s) JWKS argument is the only thing that fetches).
Altering a single byte of the certificate gives {"ok": false, "reason": "signature_invalid"} and
exit 1. Any JOSE library verifies it too: rebuild the compact JWS with the canonical payload
(header.base64url(JCS(certificate)).signature).
After rotating the signing key an old certificate still verifies: the JWKS keeps the old kid.
What it proves — and what it does not
A certificate proves that the operator asserts that, on the stores and keys it controls, the listed steps were executed and their verification queries returned the listed results, and that the assertion was signed with a key whose public half is published. It is evidence of a procedure.
It does not prove that no copy exists in a model provider (see provider_retention for the
retention class they declare), in a database backup (the ciphertext remains until backup_status
says; the keys are destroyed, and the erasure ledger re-applies the destruction after a restore), in
exports or webhooks already delivered, or in storage the operator did not inventory. With the local
KEK the destruction of the tenant key is not verifiable (see encryption.md).
Signers
DX_GOV_SIGNER selects the backend: local (default, PEM files in DX_GOV_KEY_DIR, mode 0700/0600),
openbao (Transit ed25519 keys dx-gov-deletion and dx-gov-audit) or aws-kms (ECC_NIST_P256
keys listed in DX_GOV_KMS_DELETION_KEYS / DX_GOV_KMS_AUDIT_KEYS). Deletion and audit use
different keys. A compromised signing key invalidates trust in what it signed after the compromise:
rotate it (the JWKS keeps the history) and treat later signatures with suspicion.
Replay after a restore
extractit admin erasure replay --org <id> reads every certificate under t/{tenant}/erasure/, verifies
its signature, destroys again the data keys it lists (even if a restored database brought them
back), removes the restored blob rows and the packet's rows, and records the action in the
erasure_ledger (source = replay). It is idempotent.