SSO per organization (OIDC and SAML)
Edition: commercial (extractit-ee, FSL-1.1-ALv2). Without it /v1/org/sso answers 404
and the SSO page does not exist.
An organization logs in with its own identity provider at GET /auth/login?org=<slug>. Two
kinds of IdP are supported, both through the same OIDC code flow with PKCE S256 of the web login
(see Web identity):
- OIDC directly against the customer's IdP (Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace, Keycloak...);
- SAML through a Keycloak broker: a Keycloak realm federates the customer's SAML IdP and
exposes an OIDC client to ExtractIt. ExtractIt contains no SAML code (a test fails if
python3-saml,pysaml2,signxmlorxmlsecenter the lockfile or any import).
Configure
PUT /v1/org/sso (Owner, org:manage):
{
"issuer": "https://login.example.com/realms/acme",
"client_id": "extractit",
"client_secret": "…",
"scopes": ["openid", "email", "profile"],
"groups_claim": "groups",
"role_mappings": {"dx-reviewers": "reviewer", "dx-builders": "builder"},
"default_role": null,
"enforce_sso": false
}
- On save the discovery document (
<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration) is fetched: itsissuermust match exactly andjwks_urimust use HTTPS (http only forlocalhost), or the request is 422.POST /v1/org/sso:testruns the same check without saving. client_secretis write-only: it is sealed with the tenant data key (T11) and never returned (has_client_secret). Omit it to keep the stored one;""removes it (public client).- The IdP's redirect URI is
<DX_PUBLIC_URL>/auth/callback.
Roles
The role is never taken literally from the token:
- the groups of
groups_claim(Keycloak full paths such as/dx-reviewersare accepted) are looked up inrole_mappings; with several mapped groups the most privileged role wins (admin>builder>reviewer>auditor>viewer); - otherwise
default_role; - otherwise the login is 403
no-role.
Mappings cannot grant Owner, and an Owner keeps the Owner role. There is no JIT
provisioning: a person who logs in without a membership (an invitation, or SCIM) gets 403. A
token signed for another organization's issuer fails the iss check: 401 invalid-token.
A member provisioned by SCIM logs in for the first time: the membership moves to the user
the IdP authenticates, matched by its verified email or preferred_username.
SAML through Keycloak
ee/deploy/keycloak/ holds the template: realm-acme-broker.json (the broker realm: identity
provider acme-saml, attribute importers for email and names, group mappers, OIDC client
extractit with a groups claim) and compose.keycloak.yaml (profile keycloak). For tests a
second realm, realm-acme-saml-idp.json, plays the customer's SAML IdP:
docker compose -f ee/deploy/keycloak/compose.keycloak.yaml -p dx-sso --profile keycloak up -d --wait
In production: change the hostnames, set validateSignature: true with the customer's signing
certificate on the identity provider, require signed assertions and replace the client secret.
Pending
enforce_ssois stored and shown; refusing other issuers' logins for that organization's members is not enforced yet.